CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SINCE 1989

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The rise of China as an economic and military power threatens to upset regional and global security arrangements. Based upon the desire to prevent systemic instability, the policy debate among scholars and statesmen alike now centers on how to best manage or accommodate a growing China. The conventional wisdom has argued that the West, and in particular the United States, should either "tie" China into the international system or "enmesh" it in webs of interdependence. While engagement and integration may be optimal, the success of such strategies depend upon a constellation of factors, including China's participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).

Historically, the study of Chinese foreign policy has emphasized China's security strategy and bilateral relations. Since 1971, however, China has become more integrated into the international community through its membership in various IGOs. China now interacts with *more* states *more* frequently in *more* forums than ever before, a pattern of behavior that has widened the scope of China's foreign policy calculus. A broad examination of China's participation in IGOs will not only shed light upon the long-term viability of these organizations but will also deepen scholarly understanding of the determinants of Chinese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. This article will examine China's participation in IGOs by focusing on China's declaratory policy toward one issue in one IGO, namely United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations established since 1989. U.N. peacekeeping provides a convenient window through which to undertake such a preliminary study. The U.N. is the world's most extensive IGO. Peacekeeping, in particular, is

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one of the U.N.'s most visible activities and certainly its most prominent activity in the security arena. Analysis of China's attitude toward peacekeeping operations may serve as a tentative guide to China's participation in other IGOs. Moreover, the institution of peacekeeping touches upon important issues in contemporary international security. An examination of China's attitude toward peacekeeping operations can identify China's general attitude toward multilateral intervention and collective security. Finally, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, China *must* confront the question of peacekeeping, as more than half of the all peacekeeping operations in the history of the U.N. have been established in the past six years.

Since 1989, China has adopted a cautious and conservative attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping operations. China has openly opposed aspects of Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia, Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti by abstaining on the relevant Security Council resolutions. China's pattern of opposition is nevertheless paradoxical, since not one of the major operations established since 1989, perhaps with the exception of UNTAC in Cambodia, has threatened China's territorial security. Yet, as this article will demonstrate, China's conservative attitude certainly treats recent peacekeeping operations as threatening. Lacking a physical challenge to its security, explanation must cite less orthodox determinants of Chinese foreign policy. This article shall argue that China's conservative attitude toward peacekeeping results from a normative concern to protect the status of state sovereignty that stems from the leadership's ambivalence toward China's position in the "new world order" and the atmosphere of policy caution generated by the question of leadership succession to Deng Xiaoping. China's attitude toward peacekeeping also qualifies the extent of China's future participation in security-related IGOs and highlights China's negative reaction to the demands of such increased integration into the international community.

The Past as Only Partial Prologue, 1971 to 1989

During its first ten years of participation in the U.N. system, Beijing opposed the creation and continuation of all peacekeeping operations. Three operations were established during this period, all of which addressed the Arab-Israeli conflict.[1] China registered its opposition by not participating in Security Council votes on peacekeeping resolutions, not paying its annual peace-

1. These operations were the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) II, U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and U.N. Observer Force In Lebanon (UNOFIL). This section draws extensively from Samuel Kim, *China, the United Nations, and the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); and Yitzhak Shichor, "China and the Role of the United Nations in the Middle East," *Asian Survey*, 31:3 (1991), pp. 255–69.

keeping contributions, and not donating troops to on-going operations. Beijing justified its nonparticipation by summoning arguments from the period before the PRC's representation of China in the U.N. in 1971. Based upon Mao's theory of just war, China viewed peacekeeping as an act of superpower "power politics," a pretext deployed to justify U.S. or Soviet intervention in the affairs of small states. For instance, Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador to the U.N. in the 1970s, condemned the establishment of UNEF II by stating that it would bring "infinite evil consequences in its wake and pave the way for further international intervention in the Middle East with the superpowers as the behind-the-scenes bosses.[2] Despite the rhetoric, the policy of nonparticipation bolstered domestic stability during the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution and the uncertainty of the strategic triangle with the U.S. and USSR.

In 1981, China adopted a more supportive attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping. China began to vote in favor of various peacekeeping resolutions in the Security Council, pay its annual peacekeeping contribution, and in 1990, dispatched its first contingent of military observers to a U.N. force. This new policy of cooperation resulted from changes in China's domestic politics. Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, which were predicated on access to international trade and investment, required a more open and cooperative foreign policy. At the same time, China in the early 1980s sought to distance itself from its alliance with the United States by emphasizing its role as the self-proclaimed leader of the developing world, which required a more cooperative attitude toward the U.N. and peacekeeping operations since these institutions were important to many developing states. Cooperation, however, carried little risk: the U.N. did not establish a new peacekeeping operation until 1988.

The Rise of Nontraditional Peacekeeping Operations

The U.N. Charter empowers the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Through the broad powers outlined in Chapters VI and VII of the U.N. Charter, the Council has fulfilled this mandate by establishing peacekeeping operations and authorizing enforcement actions undertaken by member states. Without formal basis in the Charter, peacekeeping evolved in the early 1950s as a response to border disputes sparked by decolonization. Peacekeeping operations were dispatched to assist in the implementation of cease-fires or political settlements to international conflicts, usually by creating a physical buffer zone between belligerent groups. Grounded in Chapter VII of the Charter, enforcement actions represent the U.N.'s armed response

2. Quoted in Kim, *China*, p. 218.

to acts of international aggression. The Council has only authorized two such actions, in Korea (1950) and Kuwait (1991).

Since 1989, peacekeeping operations have strayed from their original buffer function. After the end of the Cold War, unprecedented cooperation among the Permanent Members has enabled the Security Council to dispatch peacekeepers to address a variety of conflicts, such as civil wars, communal conflicts, and humanitarian crises. The diversity of these conflicts has broadened the *objectives* of peacekeeping operations to include state-building, humanitarian intervention, and instances of peace enforcement in addition to traditional peacekeeping. Achievement of such objectives has often required the Council to authorize the use of force under Chapter VII, a move that has blurred the traditional distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement. As a result, many operations established since 1989, especially those involving more than 1,000 military personnel, defy simple classification and frustrate academic analysis, as these operations can be grouped in terms of their mandate (e.g., humanitarian intervention) or their form (e.g., the use of force). To overcome this analytical confusion, I propose to group peacekeeping operations into traditional and nontraditional categories. Under this framework, an operation would be classified according to the method by which its mandate is implemented rather than simply by the objective stipulated by the mandate itself. By emphasizing *means* over *ends*, this framework clarifies the increasingly complex nature of recent peacekeeping operations discussed above.

The principle governing *traditional peacekeeping* operations was first defined through the establishment of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF), which was mandated to supervise the truce following the Suez crisis in 1956. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld envisioned UNEF as a stopgap measure to prevent the escalation of violence in order to give the belligerents time and space to negotiate a permanent settlement. Hammarskjöld formulated a set of operational guidelines for UNEF that have since evolved into the principles of traditional peacekeeping embraced by subsequent U.N. forces. These guidelines include (1) the impartiality of the force and its commander, (2) the consent of the host country or belligerent parties, (3) the nonuse of force except in cases of self-defense, and (4) establishment only after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement.[3] The traditional model of peacekeeping emphasizes consent and impartiality, which in turn require the nonuse of force and establishment following the conclusion of a cease-fire. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali confirmed the salience of these principles in his 1992

3. See Sally Morphet, "U.N. Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring," in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., *United Nations, Divided World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 183–239; and Jack Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly*, 15:3 (Summer 1992), pp. 113–31.

An Agenda for Peace in which he defined peacekeeping as the "deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned . . . [to] expand the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."

The principles of *nontraditional peacekeeping* follow by negative definition. Due to the increasing diversity of peacekeeping objectives, operations established after the Cold War have often departed from the traditional guidelines. Nontraditional peacekeeping refers to those operations established (1) in the absence of a political settlement, (2) without the consent of *all* parties to the conflict, (3) with the authorization to use force, or (4) under national (not U.N.) command. While enforcement actions fall by definition into the nontraditional category, aspects of peacekeeping operations should also be classified as nontraditional when they deviate from the traditional guidelines. A given operation may also often exhibit elements of both the traditional and nontraditional models. The mandate of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, which has oscillated between peacekeeping and peacemaking *cum* enforcement, provides one timely example.[4]

This framework of traditional-nontraditional principles conforms with China's general attitude toward U.N. peacekeeping operations. Since the early 1980s, China has maintained a "traditional" view of peacekeeping by stressing the importance of sovereignty and emphasizing consent and impartiality. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen outlined China's position by stating:

> It is our consistent view that peace-keeping operations should strictly conform to the principles of the U.N. Charter and the norms of international relations. Such operations should be undertaken only with the consent and cooperation of the parties concerned, and an impartial and unbiased attitude must be maintained. No peace-keeping operations or humanitarian aid programs should be permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of any country, still less to use force and get embroiled in a conflict between the parties.[5]

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4. Nontraditional elements of peacekeeping are not, strictly speaking, a product of the post-Cold War period. The U.N. Operation in the Congo (ONUC), for example, included elements that should be viewed as nontraditional, such as the offensive use of force. The above framework identifies the increasing frequency of adopting nontraditional methods of peacekeeping when an operation's mandate moves beyond separation of belligerents.

5. Qian Qichen, *Beijing Review*, 37:41 (1994), p. 29. See also Chinese statements in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping in U.N. Doc.A/SPC/SR.17; *Beijing Review*, 34:23 (June 10–16, 1991), pp. 12–14; Wang Zhongtian, "Guanyu Lianheguo weichiheping xingdong" [About United Nations peacekeeping operations] in *Guoji Zhanwang* [International outlook], no. 23 (1992), pp. 15–16; Liu Sizhao, "Lianheguo weichiheping xingdong de chengjiu he zhanwang" [The accomplishments and prospects for United Nations peacekeeping operations], in *Shijie Zhishi* [World knowledge], no. 8 (1991), pp. 20–21; and Zhang Jing, "Lianheguo weichiheping xingdong de lishi yu xianzhuang" [The history and present status of U.N. peacekeeping operations], *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, no. 4 (1994), pp. 7–13.

Likewise, according to a researcher at the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies, peacekeeping operations should "respect the sovereignty of nations and noninterference in their internal affairs," adhere "to the principle of non-use of force," and implement "the principle of neutrality and impartiality."[6] In practice, the Chinese delegation to the Security Council has usually opposed the establishment of peacekeeping operations that departed from the traditional model, especially those established under Chapter VII.

Two Paradigms: ONUMOZ and the Gulf War

Since 1989, China has supported those aspects of peacekeeping that uphold the traditional model and has opposed those aspects of peacekeeping operations based upon the nontraditional model. China's attitude toward the U.N. Mission in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) demonstrates its support for the traditional model while its attitude toward the Gulf War highlights its opposition to the nontraditional model.[7]

ONUMOZ was established by the Security Council following a peace agreement signed in October 1992 between the Mozambique government and RENAMO rebels. The Council dispatched 7,500 troops, police, and civilian administrators to monitor the cease-fire and supervise national elections. Although the elections were not held until 1995, China viewed ONUMOZ as an overwhelming if premature success. After negotiations on the elections were announced in the spring of 1993, Deputy Ambassador Chen Jian demonstrated China's support for the traditional model of peacekeeping by praising the work of ONUMOZ:

> The experience of ONUMOZ has proved that as long as the two parties to the conflict are sincere about resolving their problems through negotiations and implement the agreements reached. . . . It is highly possible for them, with the help of the international community, to end yesterday's suffering and open up a new vista.
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> *It is on this basis that United Nations peacekeeping operations will achieve success.* We sincerely hope that with the joint effects of the parties, ONUMOZ can become another success story in United Nations peacekeeping operations [emphasis added].

In particular, the Chinese delegation emphasized the importance of reaching a negotiated settlement and stressed that the international community should

6. Jiang Zhenxi, "U.N. Peace-keeping Actions Under New Circumstances," in *International Strategic Studies*, no. 4 (1992), pp. 24–25.

7. Unless otherwise indicated, all Chinese statements in the Security Council are taken from the Verbatim Records of the Security Council, noted as U.N. Document S/PV.xxxx. The relevant documents for ONUMOZ are S/PV and 3375, S/PV.3305, while the relevant documents for the Gulf War are S/PV.2963 and S/PV.2982.

play an indirect role in the peace process. Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, for example, stated that "whether the peace process in Mozambique will be completed successfully . . . depends . . . on the people of Mozambique themselves." The international community "can only help promote the process."

Although the Gulf War was an enforcement action and not a peacekeeping operation, it greatly influenced China's attitude toward multilateral intervention and the use of force. Resolution 678 (1990) authorized the U.S.-led Allied Coalition to use "all necessary means" to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait, which represented the first explicit invocation by the Security Council of Chapter VII after the Cold War and served as a turning point in China's attitude toward subsequent invocations of Chapter VII in peacekeeping resolutions. During the vote on resolution 678 (1990), China abstained to register its opposition to the use of force.[8] Although China agreed that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait, it viewed the use of force as excessive and unnecessary. At the November 1990 Security Council meeting, Qian Qichen explained China's "principled position." He stated that the use of force "runs counter to the consistent position of the Chinese government, namely to try our utmost to seek a peaceful solution." Qian also admonished the U.N. to "act with great caution and avoid taking hasty actions on such a major question as authorizing some Member States to take military actions against another Member State."

Following the promulgation of the terms of Iraqi surrender in April 1991, the Security Council through Resolution 688 (1991) authorized the establishment of safe havens to protect the Kurdish minority in northern Iraqi Kurdistan. China opposed the establishment of these safe havens through abstention by arguing that "the Security Council should not consider or take action on questions concerning the internal affairs of any state." Ambassador Li Daoyu cited Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter to explain that this action was "a question of great complexity . . . because the internal affairs of another country are also involved." Li equivocated on a solution to the problem by suggesting that the "international aspects" of the issue should be settled through "appropriate channels."

8. The political significance of China's decision to abstain has been documented elsewhere. See Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 271–75. In brief, China used the threat of vetoing Resolution 678 and thus eviscerating the facade of a U.N operation to extract concessions from the United States, which included the resumption of high-level contacts and World Bank loans that had been suspended after the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. However, this (attempted) pattern of gaining strategic rents from a nonveto has not kept pace with the proliferation of peacekeeping operations since 1989.

Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989

A recent article on China's participation in IGOs observes that "China's thinking on United Nations peacekeeping operations has relapsed to the pre-1981 position."[9] The survey of China's attitude toward peacekeeping operations since 1989 presented in this article suggests a different conclusion: that China's thinking on peacekeeping operations stems from a normative concern to protect the status of state sovereignty that reflects the ambivalence of the current leadership toward China's position in the "new world order" and the atmosphere of policy caution generated by the question of leadership succession to Deng Xiaoping.

China's attitude toward peacekeeping since 1989 differs in two ways from the pre-1981 policy of nonparticipation. First, China's current pattern of opposition has been limited, not comprehensive. Since 1989, China has not opposed *all* peacekeeping operations established by the Security Council as it did before 1981; rather China has opposed those operations that have deviated from the traditional peacekeeping principles (of nonviolence and impartiality) and has supported those operations that have upheld these principles. Second, the source of China's justification of its opposition has shifted from socialist ideology to the principle of protecting national security. Emerging from the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution and the tension of the Sino-Soviet split, China justified many of its foreign policy actions during the 1970s in terms of Maoist ideology. Then, China opposed all peacekeeping operations on the grounds that they represented a hegemonic intervention by the superpowers in the affairs of small states, a policy that was influenced by domestic politics and China's lack of familiarity with its new role as a Permanent Member of the Security Council. Today, as an increasingly integrated member of the international community, China has justified most foreign policy actions in terms of defending national security, not promoting socialism, a shift which corresponds to changes in Chinese foreign policy objectives from revolutionary to more realistic and pragmatic ones such as the promotion of domestic modernization efforts. Since 1989, China has opposed the establishment of nontraditional peacekeeping operations, which it views as eroding state sovereignty (by violating the principles of nonviolence and impartiality) and thus threatening to China's national security.

Cambodia. Through Resolution 745 (1992), the Security Council in February 1992 established the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to implement the recently signed Paris Agreements.[10] One of the largest peacekeeping operations in the history of the U.N., UNTAC comprised ap-

9. Samuel Kim, "International Organization Behavior" in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 423.

10. The relevant U.N. documents are S/PV.3287 and S/PV.3270.

proximately 22,000 soldiers, police officers, and civilian administrators who were mandated to demobilize the four warring factions, supervise national elections, repatriate refugees, and facilitate other functions of the government. Although the Khmer Rouge boycotted the May 1993 poll, a coalition government was formed.

After the elections were concluded in May 1993, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing praised UNTAC as a "successful example" for resolving "regional conflicts through peaceful means." China's support for UNTAC was paradoxical. On the one hand, Li argued that the peace process required that "the peoples in the countries concerned . . . earnestly implement the relevant agreements, and adhere to the principle of settling disputes through peaceful means." From this perspective, UNTAC was an exemplary operation. On the other hand, Li stressed that "outside forces" should not "interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia" because they would prevent the creation of an "independent, peaceful, unified and territorially integrated" state.

This image of UNTAC as a "success" does not necessarily constitute a Chinese endorsement of similar operations in other countries. UNTAC, by its very nature as a transitional *authority*, was not a traditional peacekeeping operation. Although UNTAC was established with the consent of the four belligerents and adhered to the principles of nonviolence and impartiality, its mandate resembled state-building more than peacekeeping. Elsewhere, as discussed below, the Chinese delegation often cited the infringement of sovereignty as reason to oppose peacekeeping resolutions that authorized the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter. Chinese praise of UNTAC, which by assuming many functions of the government *by definition* infringed upon the sovereignty of the Cambodian *state*, must be questioned. The most plausible explanation of China's behavior lies outside the U.N.: that China sought to improve its international reputation and regain the trust of its Southeast Asian neighbors, both of which had been tarnished by the Tiananmen massacre, by pressuring the Khmer Rouge to participate in the peace talks. As a major advocate of the operation, China could not criticize its own project.

The former Yugoslavia. As perhaps the most intractable conflict addressed by the Security Council, the situation in the former Yugoslavia does not lend itself to easy analysis.[11] Through Resolution 743 (1992), the Security Council established the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as an "interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis." Through subsequent resolutions, the Security Council expanded UNPROFOR's mandate to

11. Relevant U.N. documents are S/PV.3106, S/PV.3114, S/PV.3174, S/PV.3247, S/PV.3269, S/PV.3286, S/PV.3344, S/PV.3356, and S/PV.3367.

include the protection of humanitarian relief and the establishment of safe-haven areas.

Although China voted in favor of UNPROFOR, it has not actively supported U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia. China has opposed those alternations to UNPROFOR's mandate invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, including the protection of humanitarian relief, the tightening of the embargo, and the establishment of "no-fly" zones. In March 1994, Deputy Ambassador Chen Jian summarized China's passive policy, and argued that the international community should respect the sovereignty of Bosnia by assuming a "supplementary" role limited to urging the parties concerned to reach a negotiated solution. Chen also explained that China supported "neither the use or the threat of the use of force, nor the invocation of Chapter VII in the affairs of UNPROFOR."

China's opposition to Chapter VII alternations to UNPROFOR's mandate can be traced to Resolution 770 (1992), which authorized the use of force to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Ambassador Li Daoyu explained to the Security Council that the use of force would compromise both the security of UNPROFOR personnel and its ability to fulfill the Council's mandate by causing the conflict to spiral out of control. Li declared that invocation of Chapter VII was "inappropriate" and "should not constitute a precedent" and stressed the importance of reaching a negotiated settlement. Li also argued that the mandatory actions required by Chapter VII were inconsistent with UNPROFOR's *non*-mandatory mandate. From the Chinese point of view, these resolutions shifted UNPROFOR into the uncharted territory of nontraditional peacekeeping. Li claimed that UNPROFOR had departed from the "general regulations and guidelines established in past United Nations peacekeeping operations in implementing its mandate" because enlargement of the mandate in Resolution 770 (and subsequently 776 [1992]) failed to receive the consent of the belligerents. That these mandatory measures were enacted to protect humanitarian relief was overlooked by the Chinese delegation.

In these and subsequent debates, the Chinese delegation often offered one of three general arguments against the authorization to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter. First, China argued that force was not an effective tool of conflict resolution in international relations. Ambassador Li Zhaoxing, for example, stated that China has "steadfastly held that a lasting settlement can be achieved only through dialogue, consultation and negotiation. Any further military action in [Bosnia] will not help promote the efforts for a political solution; it will, on the contrary, further complicate the matter, thus bringing adverse affects to the search for peace."[12]

12. Chen Jian, similarly, responded to the tightening of sanctions against Yugoslavia in

Second, China argued that the use of force violated the principle of state sovereignty. During a debate on the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, Li reminded the Council that "the Chinese delegation upholds that the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of all UN Member States should be fully respected by the international community, as enshrined in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, which constitutes the basic norm guiding international relations." Chinese demands that the Council respect the sovereignty of Bosnia were also raised elsewhere, often in conjunction with an emphasis on reaching a political or negotiated settlement.

Third, embracing the principles of traditional methods of peacekeeping, the Chinese delegation argued that peacekeeping *by definition* precluded the use of force. UNPROFOR, according to Li, "is deployed . . . for the purpose of peacekeeping, and we are neither in favor of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter in peacekeeping operations, in an attempt to stop war by expanding the scope of war, nor in favor of using sanctions as a means to resolve conflicts." Li further stated that "the precondition [for extending UNPROFOR's mandate] is to obtain the prior request or consent from the host countries or parties concerned."

Based upon these arguments, China has abstained on the following resolutions: 757 (1992), which tightened economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 770 (1992), which authorized the use of force to protect U.N. convoys; 776 (1992), which enlarged UNPROFOR's mandate pursuant to 770 (1992); 781 (1992), which banned under Chapter VII flights over Bosnia; 787 (1992), which prohibited the trans-shipment of petroleum products through Serbia; 816 (1993), which authorized "all necessary measures" to enforce the no-fly zone; and 820 (1993), which further tightened sanctions and enhanced enforcement measures.[13]

Somalia. Through Resolution 751 (1992), the Security Council in April 1992 established the U.N. Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) to monitor the cease-fire between local warlords.[14] In August 1992, the Security Council expanded UNOSOM's mandate to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief and authorized an additional 3,500 troops to bolster the 500 member UNOSOM force. China supported the establishment of UNOSOM, which

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Resolution 770 (1992) by stating that "history has shown that it is impossible to find lasting solutions to conflicts and disputes by exerting pressure externally."

13. When voting on a resolution enacted nonexplicitly under Chapter VII, the Chinese delegation commonly reiterated its opposition to the invocation of mandatory measures. Commenting upon the routine extension of UNPROFOR's mandate, Li Daoyu stated that "we should like to put on record" that the practice of invoking Chapter VII "is an exceptional case and therefore does not constitute a precedent for future United Nations peacekeeping operations."

14. Relevant U.N. documents are S/PV.3060, S/PV.3145, S/PV.3188, S/PV.3229, S/PV.3317, and S/PV.3334.

adhered to the traditional principles of peacekeeping. After the vote, Ambassador Li Daoyu reminded the council that the conflict should be "settled by the Somali people themselves," and that no "external endeavors" should be enacted without the "cooperation of the Somali people."

When it became apparent that UNOSOM could not stem the rising death toll, the U.S. agreed to lead a Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Through Resolution 794 (1992), the Security Council unanimously established UNITAF "to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia." Although voting in favor of the resolution, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing viewed UNITAF as an "exceptional action" taken "in view of the unique situation in Somalia." Li further stressed that the conflict could only be resolved "through dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned." Demonstrating China's concern with the erosion of state sovereignty, Li also stated that military operations should cease as soon as a "secure environment" had been established and that control of the operation be under the authority of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

In March 1993, UNITAF devolved its responsibilities to UNOSOM II. Mandated by the Security Council to use force to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian assistance and disarm the warring factions, UNOSOM II was the first Chapter VII "peacekeeping" operation unambiguously under the control of the U.N. since the end of the Cold War. China justified its support of UNOSOM II, which deviated from the traditional model, by acknowledging that the lack of government in Somalia made peace elusive. Chen Jian, for example, stressed that because UNOSOM II "is based on the needs of the unique situation in Somalia, [it] should not constitute a precedent for future United Nations peacekeeping operations." China's attitude grew more critical after peacekeepers began to engage in combat with the Somali militias, which led to the deaths of American and Pakistani soldiers. Mirroring its attitude toward UNPROFOR, China emphasized the importance of a negotiated settlement by stating that "the final solution of the Somali question lies with the Somali people" and diminished the role of the international community by stating that it should play "only a supplementary and facilitating role in the promotion of a final settlement." Despite UNOSOM II's peace-*enforcement* mandate, China began to view the operation's objective as promoting "national reconciliation [through] *peaceful* means" (emphasis added).

By crossing the "Mogadishu line," UNOSOM II failed spectacularly to fulfill its mandate. Although most states have viewed the operation as a failure, China in particular has viewed it in hindsight as embodying the problems associated with nontraditional methods of peacekeeping, especially the use of force. In retrospect, Li explained that UNOSOM II demonstrated "that the fundamental and effective way to settle the Somali question is by peaceful

means. Resort to coercive military actions will only serve to complicate the matter." An article in the *Beijing Review* stated that "the torturous experience in Somali taught the lesson that peacekeeping must be limited to peacekeeping because the internal affairs of one country can be solved only by the people of that country. The efforts of the international community can only be helpful or supplementary."[15]

Rwanda. Despite a 1993 cease-fire, civil war erupted in April 1994 between the majority Hutu government and Tutsi rebels.[16] Reports of mass killings and ethnic cleansing prompted France to lead a multinational force named Operation Turquoise to establish a security zone in the southern part of the country. Through Resolution 929 (1994), the Security Council authorized the establishment of a "temporary operation under national command and authority aimed at contributing to the peace and security . . . using all necessary means to achieve [this] humanitarian objective."

During Council debates on Resolution 929 (1994), China opposed moving away from the traditional model of peacekeeping represented by UNAMIR. China maintained that UNAMIR's mandate should be limited to monitoring the implementation of the 1993 peace treaty, not interfering in civil war. Following the outbreak of violence in April 1994, for instance, China condemned the loss of life but did not call for the Council to adopt stronger measures. At the height of the civil war, Ambassador Li Zhaoxing only urged the belligerents to "stop killing each other" and "embrace the Arusha Peace Agreements," demands that fell on deaf ears.

China firmly opposed the establishment of Operation Turquoise by abstaining in the voting on Resolution 929 (1994). Perhaps pragmatically, China believed that force would not resolve the problem. Li cited "the experience and lessons of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia" to support this position. The Security Council, however, had entrusted the French force with a *humanitarian*, not peace-enforcement, mandate that required it to save lives and not to disarm much less attack the belligerent parties. China also opposed the operation because it lacked the consent of all parties to the conflict, a central tenet of the traditional peacekeeping. Li reminded the Council that cooperation of all the parties concerned was "an indispensable condition for the success of United Nations peacekeeping operations," a condition that the French-led force (opposed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front) failed to fulfill.

Haiti. In July 1994, the Security Council authorized a multinational coalition to assist in restoring exiled President Aristide to power.[17] Through Res-

15. He Hongze, "New Role for U.N.," *Beijing Review*, 37:2 91994), p. 23.
16. The relevant U.N. documents are S/PV.3377 and S/PV.3392.
17. The relevant U.N. documents are S/PV.3238 and S/PV.3413.

olution 940 (1994) the Council authorized Member States "to form a multinational force . . . to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island accord." Previously, the Council authorized an oil embargo in an attempt to compel the ruling junta to step down and established a small mission to help train Haiti's police force.[18]

China opposed the establishment of the U.S.-led multinational force and abstained in the voting. China opposed the resolution because the use of force "does not conform with the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and lacks sufficient and convincing ground" and threatened the impartiality of the U.N. Ambassador Li Zhaoxing warned that "the practice of the Council's authorizing certain Member States to use force . . . would obviously create a dangerous precedent." China argued, once again, that force was an ineffective tool of conflict resolution. Li noted:

> The Chinese delegation wishes to take this opportunity to emphasize that we have held all along that dialogue and negotiation are the only appropriate and effective means to resolve various international issues today, that to resort to pressure at will, sanctions, and above all the use of force does not contribute to a fundamental solution and runs counter to the post-Cold War international trend towards widespread efforts to resolve disputes and conflicts through peaceful negotiations.

Explaining China's Conservative Behavior

China's increasingly conservative policy toward U.N. peacekeeping operations could be explained in terms of Chinese pragmatism, as China has only opposed those operations that were doomed to fail anyway. China's opposition to nontraditional methods of peacekeeping thus reflects the belief that force is not an effective tool of conflict resolution in international relations and that peacekeeping operations that employ force will fail to make peace. Moreover, this interpretation can cite the experience of current peacekeeping operations as evidence. The Allied Coalition in the Gulf expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait, but President Hussein continues to nettle the Security Council. In the former Yugoslavia, UNPROFOR through NATO has failed to employ force effectively to deter continued Serbian aggression while U.N.-sponsored cease-fires come and go without lasting effect. In March 1995, UNOSOM II withdrew from Somalia because it was unable to enforce the conditions of peace.

The emphasis on pragmatism, however, tells only half the story. China's increasingly conservative policy toward peacekeeping is better explained in

18. China opposed the sanctions and objected to the Security Council's "handling matters which are essentially the internal affairs of a Member State" and opposed "resorting lightly to such mandatory measures as sanctions."

terms of the Chinese leadership's desire to protect the status of state sovereignty in the U.N. Through its statements and voting behavior in the Security Council, China has identified nontraditional aspects of peacekeeping as threatening to its national interest. China has opposed nontraditional aspects of peacekeeping because it wishes to avoid the establishment of any precedent that might erode state sovereignty or increase the likelihood of multilateral interventions in the internal affairs of states. Specifically, China has justified its opposition in terms of sovereignty in order to safeguard *Chinese* sovereignty from future intervention. Four aspects of China's behavior in the Security Council corroborate this hypothesis.

First, the arguments employed by the Chinese delegation to justify its opposition to nontraditional peacekeeping were all premised on a "thick" conception of state sovereignty. Through its statements in the Security Council, China objected to various features of nontraditional peacekeeping—the use of force (including sanctions), lack of consent and partiality—on the grounds that such measures violated the sovereignty of one or more of the belligerents. While the implications of these views will be discussed below, it is important to note that China's opposition remains opposition *in principle*, a normative position. Apart from UNTAC, not one of the major peacekeeping operations established since 1989 has even *remotely* threatened China's physical security. Through its opposition to those operations that embodied elements of nontraditional peacekeeping, China has placed the protection of the *norm* of state sovereignty within the bounds of its "national security frontier."

Second, China viewed peacekeeping operations in terms of their means, not their ends. China's statements in the Security Council emphasized the proposed *method* of implementation (to fulfill the operation's mandate) rather than the *objective* of the mandate itself (e.g., humanitarian assistance). The method of implementation received this attention because it governs that aspect of peacekeeping, intervention, that challenges the norm of state sovereignty. China simplified its analysis of peacekeeping operations, thereby ignoring or overlooking crucial differences between conflict prevention, peace-enforcement, humanitarian intervention and state-building mandates. UNOSOM II, for instance, was viewed by the Chinese delegation as a humanitarian mission while the Security Council mandated the operation with a peace-enforcement objective. Similarly, China viewed France's Operation Turquoise as a peace-enforcement operation, while the Security Council authorized the force as a humanitarian mission.

Third, China often exaggerated the implications of authorizing the use of force. China frequently opposed nontraditional methods of peacekeeping based upon Chapter VII of the Charter on the grounds that they violated the principle of state sovereignty. Yet in most instances the proposed use of

force failed to result in the predicted catastrophe.[19] The Security Council's establishment or expansion of peacekeeping mandates under Chapter VII since 1989 has rarely altered the *practical* operation of the force in question. From a legal perspective, the subsequent invocation of Chapter VII has often functioned to clarify the intent of an operation's original mandate, a distinction that the Chinese delegation publicly failed to acknowledge.[20] Contrary to China's expectations, the invocation of Chapter VII in Resolution 776 (1992) clarified UNPROFOR's power to use force to protect shipments of humanitarian relief, not to wage war against the Bosnian Serbs. Even Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, perhaps the most nontraditional operation to date, was mandated by the Council under Chapter VII to create safe havens similar to those already created in Bosnia, not repel the Rwandan Patriotic Front's offensive (although the lack of consent is another issue). The disjunction between the tenor of China's opposition to the mandatory measures of Chapter VII and the practical impact of these measures reveals China's primary concern with protecting the norm of state sovereignty—even when it was not warranted by the facts on the ground.

Finally, China *consistently* opposed nontraditional aspects of peacekeeping. This uniformity explains the relative indifference expressed by the Chinese delegation toward the *variety* of conflicts addressed by the Security Council since 1989. U.N. responses to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, genocide in Rwanda and state-building in Haiti all elicited China's uniform opposition because UNPROFOR, Operation Turquoise, and the U.S.-led multinational coalition deviated, through the authorization to use force, from the traditional model of peacekeeping. Both exceptions to this observation, China's support of UNOSOM and UNTAC, can be easily explained. China initially supported both UNOSOM I and II, and changed its position only *after* armed clashes with local militias erupted complicated fulfillment of the operation's mandate. With regard to UNTAC, China simply viewed its participation in the peace process as more important than protecting the principle of state sovereignty from further erosion.

The presence of state sovereignty in Chinese foreign policy rhetoric is not unusual. Most governments ultimately justify their foreign policy as defending the national interest defined in terms of sovereignty. Yet the nontraditional aspects of peacekeeping that China has opposed did not threaten China's interests conventionally viewed as territorial integrity or physical security. The frequency and intensity of the Chinese delegation's sovereignty-

19. The most obvious exception to this claim would be UNOSOM II, which failed precisely because of its use of force. Yet, ironically enough, China supported the establishment of UNOSOM II.

20. This principle was first established with regard to UNFICYP, where the defense of the operation's mandate was interpreted as self-defense.

based arguments with regard to peacekeeping begs the question why, which can be answered as the domestic and international levels of analysis.

From an international perspective, China's sovereignty-based opposition to nontraditional peacekeeping represents the ambivalence of the leadership in Beijing toward China's position in the post-Cold War international system. As documented elsewhere, China continues to view its security environment with uncertainty and caution.[21] The collapse of the Soviet Union has greatly improved China's territorial security and allowed the leadership to focus on domestic modernization and economic reform. Yet many Chinese analysts view the emerging multipolarity with skepticism—as improving China's diplomatic freedom but also unleashing destabilizing forces such as regionalism and ethnonationalism. Moreover, some members of the leadership view the opening of China's markets to foreign trade and investment as economic exploitation of indigenous resources, while others, especially in the military, see the U.S. as aiming to contain China's rising power in order to maintain its own influence in East Asia. China's justification of its opposition to nontraditional peacekeeping policy actions in terms of the normatively flexible rhetoric of sovereignty reveals the uncertainty with which the leadership views China's external environment. In particular, China's opposition to nontraditional peacekeeping captures the leadership's wariness of increased instances of enhanced multilateral intervention in the post-Cold War world, which they fear may limit China's diplomatic leverage or even directly challenge China's claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

From a domestic perspective, China's sovereignty-based arguments reflect the atmosphere of caution and conservatism generated by internal challenges to the party's legitimacy and the on-going succession struggle to Deng Xiaoping.[22] The devaluation of socialist ideology has forced to the CCP to ground its continued legitimacy in rising living standards, but divisions within the leadership over the pace and extent of economic reform, especially disputes over the future management of the inefficient state-owned enterprises, continually threaten to hamper economic growth. In addition, official corruption, rising crime rates, increased peasant unrest, and the destabilizing force of the "floating population" weaken public order, while separatist

21. See, for example, Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and Its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 16:1 (June 1994), pp. 14–34; Suisheng Zhao, "Beijing's Perspective of the International System and Foreign Policy Adjustment in the Post-Cold War World," *Journal of Northeast Asia Studies*, 11:3 (Fall 1992), pp. 70–83; and Chen Qimao, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey*, 33:3 (March 1993), pp. 237–51.

22. See Michael D. Swaine, *China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995); Joseph Fewsmith, "Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era," in *Asian Survey*, 35:7 (July 1995), pp. 635–51; and Gerald Segal, *China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy*, Adelphi Paper 287, March 1994.

movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, not to mention the proliferation of alternative sources of allegiance such as underground labor movements, secret societies and illegal churches, highlight the party's waning power over society. The defensiveness that characterizes China's peacekeeping policy is one probable side-effect of these internal legitimacy challenges, no doubt capturing the traditional fear that domestic unrest invites foreign aggression. Moreover, the dynamics of the leadership succession struggle, especially the need of individual leaders to appear as uncompromising defenders of China's national interest, enhance the tendency toward external defensiveness.

Cooperative Behavior and Interdependence

The above analysis of China's attitude toward peacekeeping poses several implications for China's future cooperation in security-related IGOs and China's increased integration into the international community.

Limits of cooperative behavior. China's cooperative behavior in the Security Council toward peacekeeping can be described as defensive and paradoxical. China's behavior is defensive because it demonstrates concern for the principle of sovereignty over the strengthening of the institutions of peacekeeping and collective security. As discussed above, the linkage of state sovereignty with China's national security demonstrates the leadership's fear that the erosion of this principle may damage *Chinese* sovereignty. The leadership views peacekeeping as threatening to China's interests even when all but one of the major operations established since 1989 have failed remotely to threaten China's territorial integrity. While structural changes in the international system after the Cold War have increased the opportunities for cooperation among the Permanent Members to maintain international peace and security, China has adopted a more conservative policy toward peacekeeping commonly held by the Security Council *during* the Cold War.

China's cooperative behavior is paradoxical because China has achieved formal participation without substantive commitment. The recent observation that China tends "toward the creation and maintenance of more extensive and more enduring cooperative relationships"[23] should be qualified with respect to China's behavior in the U.N. Security Council. Likewise, the view that post-Cold War Chinese foreign policy aims to achieve the "collegial sharing of power among nations, with the United Nations playing a leading

23. Harry Harding, "China's Cooperative Behavior" in Shambaugh and Robinson, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 399.

role"[24] should be questioned. On the one hand, in contrast to the 1970s, China now pays its annual peacekeeping assessments, has dispatched small contingents of personnel to U.N. forces, and participates in all Security Council votes. The use of the abstention rather than nonparticipation to register its opposition reflects China's complete *formal* participation. On the other hand, however, China's *commitment* to the institution of peacekeeping is weak. During Security Council debates, China's emphasis on achieving negotiated settlements often explicitly downgraded the role of the U.N. in the dispute settlement process. Moreover, China rarely, if ever, offered publicly any policy alternative to current international crises other than inaction to the other members of the Security Council. While the U.N. was created to end the scourge of war by taming the impact of anarchy in international relations, China has viewed peacekeeping as the beast to be caged within a thick conception of state sovereignty.

Constraints of interdependence. China's defensive and paradoxical behavior with regard to U.N. peacekeeping represents, in part, a backlash to China's increased integration in the international community. Since 1979, the economic reforms, which were predicated on access to international trade and investment, have transformed China's bilateral and transnational relationships. China now interacts *more* frequently with *more* states than ever before. This increasing interdependence has widened the scope of China's foreign policy calculus because the leadership has been forced to confront issues that it would otherwise have chosen to ignore. Policy in one area, such as peacekeeping, may impact upon China's bilateral relations and certainly affects other states' perception of China's intentions.

The prominence of sovereignty rhetoric in China's peacekeeping policy should be viewed in the context of this interdependence. In particular, it should be viewed as China's negative reaction to its increasingly complex global position. During the reform period, the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy focused on the promotion of domestic modernization through marketization and the opening of China's economy to international trade and investment. As China's integration into the international community has deepened, one unwelcomed side-effect has been the erosion of the legitimacy of the CCP. Awareness made possible by communications technology of the global devaluation of communism, economic linkages with the proliferation of new states on China's western border, and the rising ex-

24. James C. Hsiung, "China's Omnidirectional Diplomacy," *Asian Survey*, 35:6 (June 1995), p. 574. If China does see the U.N. as playing a leading role in this regard, it would be premised upon a very different U.N. than the one that exists today. In particular, the number and scale of peacekeeping operations would be severely curtailed, which goes against the desires of many states, both in the West and the developing world.

pectations of the general population generated by the reforms, all challenge the authority of the CCP.

In the context of increasing interdependence, China's peacekeeping policy mirrors the leadership's domestic emphasis on maintaining legitimacy and power. The importance that China has attached to the *principle* of state sovereignty reflects the leadership's concerns about threats to *Chinese* sovereignty. Notably, perceived threats to China's sovereignty have increased in the post-Cold War era. The separatist movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia challenge the legitimacy of the CCP and the territorial integrity of the Chinese state. Within the ambit of Greater China, Britain's democratic reforms in Hong Kong sought to weaken the scope of China's sovereignty over the territory in 1997. Across the Straits, Taiwan's informal diplomacy and continuing quest for de facto international recognition perpetually raises the question of reunification. In the South China Sea, China claims sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, which lie hundreds of miles from the mainland and are also claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei.

Use of the abstention with regard to U.N. peacekeeping resolutions represents the leadership's reaction to China's increasingly complex external environment. Abstention, however, is only a band-aid solution. It is reactive, not proactive. In the coming decade, the gap between China's present attitude toward collective security as seen through its peacekeeping policy and the requirements of future peacekeeping operations will only grow. Peacekeeping operations will most likely continue to adopt nontraditional methods of peacekeeping to address nontraditional challenges to international security. So long as this trend continues, the distance between China's ability to maintain its own "independent" position and the requirements of membership in IGOs such as the U.N. will widen. At some point, which is of course difficult to predict, China will have to choose between its commitment to an independent foreign policy and its commitment to the missions of various IGOs, which other states may use as prerequisites for continued harmonious relations with China. Participation in one IGO may require more than China is willing to give.

In sum, the prospects for China's future participation in IGOs are lukewarm. If peacekeeping policy serves as a tentative guide, China's future cooperative behavior should be viewed with reservation. While China will no doubt deepen its formal participation in IGOs, questions remain regarding China's substantive participation. Similar to other issue areas, especially in the security arena, China's recent policy toward U.N. peacekeeping has been reactive, not proactive. Ambivalence best captures China's behavior, perhaps a rendition of "can't live with it, can't live without it" with Chinese characteristics.