Category: China

China and the Border Dispute with India After 1962

I have contributed a chapter to the Routledge Handbook of China–India Relations. Specifically, I review China’s approach to its disputed border with India after the war between the two countries in 1962.

China’s approach has emphasized maintaining stability on its southwestern frontier, defined as preventing the escalation of armed conflict on the border and maintaining a dominant position in the dispute it enjoyed after the war.

For China, its dispute with India has always been a strategic secondary direction and not the primary focus of its military strategy. Dominance on the border and deterring Indian challenges form the basis of stability from China’s standpoint.

Read a preprint here.

Dangerous Confidence?: Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

In a new article in International Security, Fiona Cunningham and I explore Chinese views of nuclear escalation.

Our review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China’s strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China’s nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons).

The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China’s strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation.

China’s confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.

Read the article here.

China as a “World-Class Military”

Yesterday, I testified before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which was established to review developments in China.

The hearing examined the ambitions of China’s People’s Liberation Army’s as a “world-class military.”

My testimony reviewed the origins of the use “world-class military” to argue that it should be viewed as a force development concept, not one that outlined China’s global military ambitions. I also argued that, from the standpoint of strategy and warfighting, the PLA will remain focused on East Asia.

Read my testimony or watch the entire hearing.

Active Defense now available

My new book on China’s military strategy, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949, is now available, published by Princeton University Press.

The book offers the first systematic study of the military strategies adopted by the People’s Republic of China since 1949. Overall, the PLA has formulated nine military strategies, three of them which constituted major changes in strategy and sparked the transformation of the PLA’s doctrine, force structure, and training.

Read more about the book here.

Major Changes in China’s Military Strategy

I recently published an article in International Security on China’s military strategy, entitled “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining China’s Changes in Military Strategy.”

The article contains three main points:

  1. China has adopted nine military strategies since 1949, or what the PLA calls “strategic guidelines.”
  2. The strategies adopted in 1956, 1980 and 1993 represented major changes in the PLA’s approach military strategy, requiring significant organizational change.
  3. China has pursued major changes in its military strategy in response to shifts in warfare in the international system, but only when the CCP is united and delegated responsibility for military affairs to the PLA’s senior officers.

The article is a teaser for a much longer book on the subject, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949, which will be published in early 2019.

Read the article here.

Why India did “Win” the Standoff with China

In response to the disengagement of Chinese and Indian forces announced on August 28th, I wrote a short essay for War on the Rocks.

Specifically, I argue that it is misguided to view the disengagement is a “win” for India and a “loss” for China. Moreover, due to unique factors, Doklam does not provide a model for countering China’s coercion elsewhere

Moreover, due to unique factors, Doklam does not provide a model for countering China’s coercion elsewhere.

Read the piece here.

Danger at Dolam

I wrote the following op-ed, “Danger at Dolam,” for the Indian Express, on July 18, 2017

***

The standoff between Indian and Chinese forces on the Dolam Plateau is entering its fourth week. India and China have both miscalculated, with potentially dire consequences. China clearly did not appreciate the sensitivity that India attaches to any Chinese presence on the Jampheri Ridge south of the plateau and the implications for the security of the Siliguri Corridor that connects eastern India with the rest of the country. A decade ago, for example, Indian soldiers training the Royal Bhutanese Army in Bhutan challenged a Chinese foot patrol that was discovered along the ridge.

China clearly did not appreciate the sensitivity that India attaches to any Chinese presence on the Jampheri Ridge south of the plateau and the implications for the security of the Siliguri Corridor that connects eastern India with the rest of the country. A decade ago, for example, Indian soldiers training the Royal Bhutanese Army in Bhutan challenged a Chinese foot patrol that was discovered along the ridge.

India, however, clearly did not appreciate the degree to which China believes it has already established a presence on the plateau, which forms part of China’s dispute with Bhutan in this area. In either the 1980s or early 2000s, China built a dirt road from the Chumbi Valley in Tibet to Shenche La that Bhutan views as the border with China, and then onto the Dolam Plateau. In fact, this road terminates perhaps just 100 metres from the Indian outpost at Doka La, near the site of the current standoff. Probably at the end of the 2000s, China enhanced or regraded the road and added the “turning point” where Chinese vehicles turn around to return to the Chumbi Valley. The road is likely used only in the summer months to facilitate patrols in the area (including surveying Indian presence at Doka La).

For India, any Chinese presence on the Dolam plateau is worrying. And any extension of the road toward the Jampheri Ridge would constitute a real change to the status quo. Yet for China, India’s actions are also unprecedented. As former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote a few weeks ago, “This is the first time that Indian forces have engaged China from the soil of a third country.” Specifically, the Indian Army moved forces beyond the international border to pre-empt Chinese efforts to start extending the road toward the Jampheri Ridge.

Unfortunately, the 1890 convention delimiting the border between Tibet and Sikkim may worsen the situation. The convention contains a contradiction that allows each side to claim it supports its own position. Article 1 states that the border begins at Mount Gimpochi, roughly 3 km south of the Chinese road and the western point of the Jampheri Ridge. Article 1 also states that the boundary will follow the watershed. Unfortunately, however, Mount Gimpochi is not the start of the watershed, and the convention did not explain how to square this circle. Sometime between 1907 and 1913, Britain published a map of the area showing the border starting at Batang La, 6 km north of Mount Gimpochi, effectively changing the terms of the convention.

Unsurprisingly, India and China have chosen the starting point of their border in the region that maximises their interest. But this also creates a conflict between the black letter of 1890 convention, which Britain and China ratified, and the main principle of delimitation. Moreover, these divergent interpretations bear a disturbing resemblance to the dispute over the Thag La ridge and Dhola post in the eastern sector of the China-India border dispute, the proximate spark for the 1962 war.

In the eastern sector, India maintained that the China-India border was delimited by the McMahon Line from the 1914 Simla Convention. McMahon’s line generally followed the watershed between present-day India and China. Unfortunately, for the last 25 km or so, the line did not follow the watershed but was drawn south of the Thag La Ridge. The post at Dhola that the Indian Army established in June 1962 lies in the area between the watershed to the north and the McMahon Line to the south. China challenged the Indian post as being located in undisputed Chinese territory. The gradual of escalation of tensions over Dhola played a key role in Mao Zedong’s final decision to launch a wider war on October 22, 1962.

To be sure, the analogy to the present is imperfect. Overall, India-China relations are stable, including on the border. Neither side has deployed large numbers of forces nearby on Dolam. Unlike Dhola, where China dominated the high ground, the local geography favours India, which can easily deploy forces already in Sikkim. China must rely on the single road in the area that climbs more than 1,400 meters from the Chumbi Valley to the Dolam Plateau.

Despite the imperfections of the analogy, it highlights the danger of the present situation. China believes the black letter of the 1890 convention not only supports its presence on the Dolam Plateau but also its right to extend roads in the area south to Gimpochi. India believes the border lies to the north at Batang La, which justifies its challenge of China beyond its borders on the Dolam Plateau. But this is based on the principle contained in the convention and what appears to be Britain’s subsequent map.
The longer the standoff lasts, the more easily these positions will harden. For example, given the unprecedented Indian presence in territory disputed by China and Bhutan, China may conclude that it needs to strengthen its physical position on the Dolam Plateau. Beijing could build more permanent structures a kilometre or two behind the “turning point” at Doka La. That is, China may use the Indian challenge to justify further steps to consolidate its presence on Dolam. India would then be faced with accepting a larger, more permanent Chinese presence or escalating further to stop it. The most realistic outcome would be

The most realistic outcome would be restoration of the situation before June. This would mean the return of Indian troops to Indian territory and the withdrawal of Chinese construction crews from the area. India may demand or hope that China will vacate the Dolam Plateau, but China is unlikely to leave an area where it believes it had already maintained a presence for decades. The danger inherent in the current stand-off demands a quick resolution.