In an essay for Foreign Affairs, I examine the impact purges in the PLA high command on its combat readiness. The essay is available here.

For a Chatham House project on competing visions of international order, I wrote the chapter on China’s vision of international order in 2030.

I argue 1) China articulates a Westphalian vision of order based on the primacy of states and on principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention, 2) the main purpose of China’s vision of order since the end of the Cold War has been to reduce the influence of the US in an era in which liberal ideas along with US power have been ascendant, and 3) China has pursued this vision of order much more actively and vigorously in the past decade, as its national capabilities have grown substantially and as its rivalry with the US has intensified.

Read my chapter here.

My chapter in an excellent edited volume on US-China Relations, Not Just Another Cold War, from Nobel Institute symposium held in June 2022.

My chapter examines US-China how technological competition, arguing that China is seeking to become a technological superpower and the United States is increasingly focused on preventing China from fulfilling this ambition.

Read more on the book here.

As part of a Carnegie Endowment project on US-China relations in 2034, Eric Heginbotham and I examine what a stable military balance of power in East Asia might look like. Our analysis is based on achieving such a balance through a conventional military strategy of denial.

Our chapter is available here.

In the China Leadership Monitor, I examine China’s Global Security Initiative, one of China’s three new global initiatives, on the second anniversary of its introduction.

The article takes stock of the GSI’s development since 2022, examining and assessing its content has been fleshed out, how it has been received by other states, and how its implementation has progressed. To date, the GSI’s content remains vague and broad, most likely to increase support, pursue opportunistic implementation, and discredit the United States as a security actor. Formal support from other states, as reflected in including the GSI in joint documents, is limited. The GSI’s implementation has been uneven, especially in Asia, with few regional organizations offering unqualified support and or pursuing cooperation under the banner of the initiative. Looking ahead, the prospects for the GSI and its implementation are mixed.

Read the article here.

In War on the Rocks, George Gilboy, Eric Heginbotham and I update our analysis of how to estimate China’s defense spending by using the latest PPP conversion factors from the World Bank.

Read the essay here.

In Foreign Affairs, Henrik Hiim, Magnus Troan and I wrote a short piece summarizing our much longer article in International Security. Read the article here.

In The Washington Quarterly, I examine potential lessons China may be learning from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  Read the article here.

An article with outstanding MIT students that examines why countries do—or do not—choose to formally join China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Read the article here or via a PDF.

In Foreign Affairs, I challenge the conventional wisdom that China under Xi is prone to engage in diversionary war behavior. Read the article here.