Category: United States

Stormy Seas: The South China Sea in US-China Relations

In this book chapter, Kacie Miura and I examine the role of the disputes in the South China Sea in the evolution of US-China relations.

Based on an examination of American and Chinese views of each other’s role in these waters over the last decade, we argue that the dispute has increased the scope and intensity of security competition between the United States and China. Each side now views the SCS disputes as a litmus test for the other’s intentions—for China, whether the US seeks to contain it; for the US, whether China seeks to overturn the existing regional order.

It appeared in a terrific volume on US-China relations edited by Avery Goldstein and Jacques De Lisle, After Engagement: Dilemmas in U.S.-China Security Relations.

Read the chapter here.

Threading the Needle: The South China Sea Disputes and U.S.-China Relations

In a chapter in a recently published edited volume, Strategic Adjustment and the Rise of China, I examine how the United States and China have managed the South China Sea disputes in their relations with each other.

First, actions by the United States and China have often created incentives for the other state to push back, creating negative spirals.

Second, China and the United States have enhanced their positions in the South China Sea.

Third, actions taken by both sides have helped to shield the broader relationship from tensions and competition in the dispute.

Read the chapter here.

The Certainty of Uncertainty in U.S.-China Relations

I wrote the following essay, “The Certainty of Uncertainty: U.S.-China Relations in 2017,” for an ISSF Policy Roundtable on “U.S.-China Relations and the Trump Administration.”  Other contributors include Dingding Chen, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Essay by Joseph Siracusa, Toshi Yoshihara and Zhu Feng.


The Certainty of Uncertainty: U.S.-China Relations in 2017

It is probably impossible to predict how U.S.-China relations will unfold under the Trump administration. Almost one hundred days into the new presidency, the national security apparatus remains largely unstaffed, apart from the secretaries of state and defense along with a handful of officials in the National Security Council. The administration has been unable to conduct policy reviews of many issues, especially the overall approach to Asia, including China. Even if such a review had been conducted, the administration lacks the middle-level managers to execute a region-wide policy.

The issues over which a crisis between the United States and China could erupt are easy enough to identify. The most immediate and pressing concern is North Korea and the acceleration of its of nuclear and missile programs. The other issues all involve disputes featuring Chinese sovereignty or territorial claims. In the East China Sea, China disputes the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands, which Japan also claims. Although the United States does not acknowledge Japan’s sovereignty over these rocks, it does recognize them as territories under the administration of Japan and thus covered by Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty. A crisis between China and Japan over the Senkakus would almost certainly trigger the treaty and involve the United States.

Across the Taiwan Strait, the election of Tsai Ying-wen as President of Taiwan has renewed concerns on the mainland about the island’s drift toward independence, challenging national unification and one of Beijing’s explicit core interests. Taiwan is not a formal ally of the United States, but Washington is closely involved in its defense through the commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act. A crisis across the Strait would quite likely result in the involvement of the United States

In the South China Sea, China disputes two archipelagos, the Paracels and Spratlys, with several other states. Vietnam challenges China’s claim over the Paracels; Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei challenge its claim over the Spratlys. China also claims maritime jurisdiction and historic rights over much of the waters in the South China Sea (presumably, though not explicitly, enclosed by the ‘nine-dashed’ line that appears on most Chinese maps). Only one of the other claimants to the Spratlys, the Philippines, is a treaty ally, but the United States has identified a vital interest in freedom of navigation through these waters.

These issues alone are cause for concern. But they are unfolding against a dramatic change in the balance of power created by the rise of China. China is not only the second largest economy in the world, but it is also the dominant economy in the region, more than twice the size of Japan, whom it surpassed in 2010. The changing balance of power elevates the stakes in the potential conflicts described above. For the United States and many in the region, China’s assertiveness over Taiwan or in its sovereignty disputes is viewed as a litmus test for how China as a dominant power might behave. For China, however, resistance in what it views as long-standing historical disputes reflects a rejection of its rise. China is more able than ever to defend its interests in these disputes, a situation which triggers broader concerns about order in the region – a volatile mix.

Enter President Donald Trump. During the transition, Trump appeared willing to challenge China more forcefully on many of these issues. When he spoke over the telephone with President Tsai, he questioned whether his administration would abide by the ‘One China’ policy, which has served as the framework for diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic for more than forty years. Following criticism of his phone call, he doubled-down, questioning explicitly whether the policy was worth continuing. Likewise, he scolded China over the South China Sea. All of this before inauguration.

Since then, Trump has appeared to moderate his stance. In a phone call with President Xi Jinping on early February, Trump indicated he would support the ‘One China” policy. “At the request of President Xi,” he was reported to have “agreed…to honor our ‘One China’ policy.”[4] In the South China Sea, the United States has maintained an active naval presence, but has not yet conducted any Freedom of Navigation Operations to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims. In Beijing in March, Trump’s Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, even repeated a phrase associated with China’s desire to build a “new type great power relationship” that is seen as a Chinese effort to gain U.S. acquiesce on its core interests, especially Taiwan.[5]

After the summit at the Mar-a-Largo golf club in Florida, many pundits must have been surprised. Trump did not offer a ‘grand bargain’ to Xi, and Xi did not bring a treasure chest of pledged investments. Instead, in their dinner and then working lunch, the two leaders agreed to create a new framework for issue-specific dialogues to replace the unwieldy Security & Economic Dialogue. This was another positive development, reflecting the start of an effort to build a working relationship for the many issues that the two sides need to address. The need to take action on North Korea may have also overshadowed Trump’s desire to press China on specific issues, especially trade, given the prevailing view that only Beijing has sufficient leverage over Pyongyang to compel it to abandon or at least freeze its nuclear and missile programs.

All along, China has been remarkably restrained. To be sure, Trump’s election was unexpected in Beijing. China had forged few ties with the campaign and finally found a channel through Jared Kushner, which paved the way for the February phone call and April summit. Observing Trump’s more general impetuousness, Beijing likely concluded that maintaining stability in the bilateral relationship was paramount. Trump would not be given a reason to lash out at Beijing. More generally, with the 19th Party Congress convening sometime in the fall of 2017 to select new members of the leading bodies of the Chinese Communist Party, the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, Beijing prizes stability above all else, at home and abroad.

So far, so good. Yet can this nascent trajectory of cooperation last? Trump has shown that talk is cheap. China has little reason to rely on his word alone and will watch U.S. actions with great care. As quickly as Trump reversed many of his positions on China during the campaign, he may switch back. Because it is an election year in China, the leadership in Beijing is extra sensitive to perceived threats from abroad and will view them as an effort to exploit China’s desire for stability. Trump could easily pose such a threat to China, unraveling the progress that has been achieved since the inauguration. And many opportunities for a crisis to occur are present.

Xi, Trump, and One China

Yesterday, I joined the conversation at ChinaFile, following President Trump’s phone call with Xi Jinping and Trump’s commitment to the “one China” policy:

In his phone call with Xi, Trump stated he agreed “to honor our ‘one China’ policy.” During the transition before his inauguration, Trump conducted an unprecedented phone call with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, and created uncertainty about whether his administration would continue with the “one China” policy, which has served as the foundation of U.S.-China relations. In an interview with Fox, he said “I don’t know why we have to be bound by a ‘one China’ policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things.”

The initial response to the call has been to declare Xi the “winner” and Trump the “loser,” based on Trump’s reversal. The New York Times declared that Trump’s move “gives China an upper hand.” Yet diplomacy is not a boxing match. The rush to keep score is premature for several reasons.

First, Trump only referred to the policy. In all the available readouts of the call, no mention exists of Trump repeating the components of the one China policy, which include the three communiqués (1972, 1979, 1982), the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, and the 1982 “six assurances” given to Taiwan. Although a helpful affirmation of the foundation of U.S.-China relations, Trump’s general reference to the one China policy left him room to interpret it broadly.

Second, with Tsai’s election as Taiwan’s President, Beijing has pressed her to affirm the “1992 consensus” about one China. Her reluctance to do so means Beijing is growing ever more suspicious of her intentions regarding independence. In this context, if Trump decides to significantly alter U.S. relations with Taiwan, even if he does so while remaining under the umbrella of a one China policy, tensions in U.S.-China relations will likely increase significantly.

Third, talk is cheap. Trump is an unconventional president, with a transactional orientation and impulse. He may change his mind, or offer a new interpretation. China will also push to cement his pledge in the call in other meetings and joint statements between U.S. and Chinese officials. Trump may decide to push back.

Finally, beyond the call, how will the two sides address the key issues in the region and the relationship that require their engagement? In addition to Taiwan, these include the DPRK’s nuclear program, maritime claims in the South China Sea, and bilateral trade, to name a few. The call was a positive development, but the key question is whether Xi and Trump can work together. Keeping score of “winners” and “losers,” and who has the upper hand, misses the bigger picture altogether.